(Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal (De)Construction of Female Beauty by Baron, Stacey S
Boston College Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 3
3-1-2005
(Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal
(De)Construction of Female Beauty
Stacey S. Baron
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stacey S. Baron, (Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal (De)Construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C.L. Rev.
359 (2005), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol46/iss2/3
(UN )LAWFULLY BEAUTIFUL: THE LEGAL
(DE)CONSTRUCTION OF FEMALE BEAUTY
Abstract: Beautiful women are more revered, more desirable, and often
times more employable than average-looking women. Despite an ever-
increasing awareness of women's issues today, little progress has been
made to reverse the objectification of women's bodies. This Note asserts
that various courts are helping deconstruct the idea that beautiful women
should receive preferential treatment in the workplace, simply because
they are beautiful. This Note contends that the law progressively is
challenging social assumptions that favor traditionally beautiful women by
telling employers that they can no longer demand a certain level of
female attractiveness in certain contexts. By deemphasizing the general
importance of the female body, the law implicitly is doing women of all
shapes and sizes, races and skin tones, a favor immeasurable by any scale.
INTRODUCTION
The 2003 California Court of Appeal case, Yanowitz v. L'Oreal
USA, Inc., invigorated the debate about the importance of beauty and
the pervasiveness of appearance and sex discrimination in the work-
place.' Although this decision addressed a claim of unlawful retalia-
tion under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"),
the first prong of the court's analysis invoked protections against sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII").2 The controversial conclusion made by this court was that an
I See 131 Cal. Rptr. 2c1 575, 582 (Ct. App. 2003). Compare, e.g., Elizabeth M. Adamitis,
Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASII. L.
REv. 195, 219, 223 (2000) (arguing for statutory protection of physical appearance because
of the harmful, unfair, discriminatory effects in which appearance bias results), with, e.g.,
James .). McDonald, Jr., Civil nights for the Aesthetically-Challenged, 29 EMPLOYEE REL. U. 118,
127-28 (2003) (arguing that legally protecting personal appearance is an unacceptable
extension of civil rights law that may encourage employers to favor unattractive applicants
to avoid lookism lawsuits").
2 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 12940(h) (West 1992) (making it unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee
who has opposed practices prohibited by California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FF,LIA") or filed a complaint, testified, or assisted a person in any proceeding under
FE11A); Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585,90, 587 n.5. In Yanowitz, the plaintiff asserted an
unlawful retaliation claim in violation of FERIA because she herself was termitiated Ibr not
firing an unattractive employee, which the court deemed to be a prot., , 	activity. 131
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585-90. The pivotal question was whether the plaintiff 	 I in a pro-
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employer's order to fire a female cosmetic associate for "not being hot
enough" was an act of sex discrimination—a conclusion that evi-
dences the law's growing willingness to protect women who may not
meet society's rigorous standards of physical attractiveness.3
By holding that a male executive may not insist on the termina-
tion of a female associate who was not sexually appealing to him, this
decision raises critical questions for many employers who prefer to
hire aesthetically pleasing employees. 4
 For example, how far can em-
ployers go when using physical attractiveness as an employment re-
quirement, and can employers require their female employees to be
"hot" or "sexy"?5
 Legal commentary has argued both for and against
this proposition. 6
 Recently, scholars even have suggested that local
legislation prohibiting appearance discrimination is a possible means
of addressing the problems arising from our "lookist" culture.? Such
growing attention to issues of "lookism" in the law indicates that this
topic is noteworthy, although it is not new. 9
When courts addressed the airline industry's systemic patterns of
only hiring attractive, thin flight attendants in the late 1970s and early
1980s, attention surrounding the issue of appearance discrimination
became amplified.9
 Similarly, this debate generated scrutiny of the
news reporting and hotel industries for requiring their female em-
ployees to meet certain criteria of beauty and femininity. 10 As the serv-
ice industries expanded during the 1980s, however, and a culture of
meted activity under FEHA. Id. Given FEFIA's similarity to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
("Tide VII"), the court applied a Title VII sex discrimination analysis to determine if the
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity. Id. at 587 n.5.
3 See Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
4 See id.
See id.; McDonald, supra note 1, at 127-28 (arguing that employers have a right to
hire employees that meet certain standards of presentation).
6 Compare, e.g., Adamitis, supra note 1, at 219-20 (arguing for statutory protection of
physical appearance through state and local laws), with, e.g., McDonald, supra note 1, at
118, 127 (arguing against any form of legal protection of physical appearance).
7 See, e.g., Aclamitis, supra note 1, at 219. But see Lynn T. Vu, A More Attractive Look at
Physical Appearance-Based Discrimination: Filling the Gap in Appearance-Based Anti-Discrimination
Law, 26 S. ha... U. U. 339, 357 (2002) (arguing for a narrow statutory approach to appear-
ance discrimination, limiting protection to instances when victims are offered no other
legal remedy).
>;
	 Yanowi tz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 587 (noting the long-established principle that an
employer may not insist hiring only attractive women).
9 See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Stapp. 292, 296 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
10 See, e.g., Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1987);
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985).
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consumerism began to define American life, a social obsession with
looking at and commercializing the female body exploded." The use
of the female body as a consumer artifact became popular, and the
technology of modern image production continually recreated the
image of the perfect body, providing evidence of a consumer society
built on visual stimulation and male economic agency. 12 Attention,
therefore, increasingly turned to the regulation of female appearance
in the workforce because the growing consumer society demanded
the specularization of women . t 5 The litigation surrounding such
beauty requirements adopted by certain industries helped formulate a
legal response to appearance discrimination, a response that has un-
derlying meaning for many women whose looks concern them."
The Yanowitz case highlights modern day pressures women feel to
be beautiful. 15 This Note focuses on the contention that the law need
not be criticized so severely for perpetuating harmful notions of fe-
male beauty. 16 Rather, the evolution of appearance law exemplified by
Yanowitz evidences glimmers of hope for dealing with such harmful
social stereotypes, 17 Although Glamour and Maxim magazines may not
be following suit in proffering divergent forms of female beauty, a ju-
, dicial and statutory trend is emerging that potentially could help
women redefine what is an acceptable and attractive form of personal
appearance. 18
II See ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 111-12 (1997).
12 Id. at 116.
12 See, e.g., Crafl, 766 F.2d at 1209; 1-IvoE, supra note 11, at 115-17.
l4 See infra notes 58-216 and accompanying text.
15 See 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
16 See infra notes 58-310 and accompanying text.
17 See 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588; DEBRA L. GIMI.IN , BODY WORK: BEAUTY AND SELF-IMAGE
IN AMERICAN CULTURE 8-9 (2002) (arguing that as women engage in exhaustive body
work trying to attain the perfect female body, they have the ability to transform cultural
meanings about ideologies of beauty); Naomi WOLF, THE BEAUTY Mime How IMAGES of
BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN 9-11 (1991) (arguing that as women become more
powerful, influential, and capable of transforming society, ideals of female beauty heroine
more rigid and unattainable, resulting in a form of female disempowerment that. has
women starving themselves to death and consuming their lives with self-loathing as op-
posed to sell-production); Reena N. Glazer, Women's Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L4.
113,115-17 (1993) (arguing that laws criminalizing the exposure of women's breasts rein-
force the ideas that the female body must be hidden in shame, and that women's desires
about how to present their bodies need strict nude regulation).
See 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588; see also Steven Greenhouse, Going for the Look, but Risking
Discrimination, N.Y. TistE.s, July 13,2003, at Al 2 (accusing the popular clothing store Aber-
crumble & Fitch of actively seeking out and giving hiring preferences to sleek, sexy, white,
attractive sales associates); Erin Schneweis, Tap-Selling Female Magazines Exploit Female Body, Not
Unlike Maxim Magazine, KANSAS STATE ECOLLEGIAN (Apr. 7,2000), at hilp://www.kstatecolle-
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This Note explores a modern legal trend to protect varying forms
of "femininity" or female beauty under Title VII and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (the "ADA").' 8 The end result of this trend is a
noteworthy break from social constructions that narrowly define fe-
male beauty, helping to foster social acceptance of more diversified
forms of female appearances." Instead of focusing on how the law
perpetuates negative female body images, this Note exposes the posi-
tive results for women flowing from appearance-based litigation. 21
Part I of this Note reviews the role of beauty in society, examining
how many women continuously struggle to attain an ideal form of
beauty.22
 This Part. lays out a foundation for why and how women feel
the way they do about their bodies, highlighting the problems many
women face because of the social pressures to be beautiful. 23 Part II
focuses on how the law historically has approached issues related to
the physical appearance of women in the workforce, providing a dis-
cussion of appearance discrimination under (1) the liberty protec-
tions of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, (2) Title VII, and (3) the ADA.24 Because these ar-
eas of the law implicitly address the issue of women's body image, they
provide a background as to how the law relates to the subject." Part
HI provides a two-fold analysis of the case law. 26 It analyzes how the
law both reflects and influences popular images of female beauty." In
addition, it argues that the law is moving in a positive direction when
it comes to defining diverse forms of female beauty, implicitly sending
the important message to women that their bodies need not conform
to the traditional ideal form. 28 This Note contends that such a trend is
gian.cont/issues/v104/sp/n131/opinion/opmfridayschneweishtml. But see McDonald, su-
pm note l, at 118 (arguing that judicial recognition of appearance discrimination under the
rubric of sex discrimination is "disturbing").
Ri See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
20 See infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; id. §§ 12101-12213; see
infra notes 58-216 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 58-216 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
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good for women because it helps deconstruct the social value placed
on their bodies. 29
I. TIIE ROLE OF BEAUTY IN SOCIETY
Across the United States, many young girls and grown women alike
wake up each morning, look in the mirror, and ask the fateful question,
"Am I thin enough yet?"3° The statistics are striking: seventy-five percent
of all women feel that they arc fat, eighty-one percent of ten-year-olds
are afraid of being fat, and two out of five women would trade three to
five years of life to achieve their ideal body weight. 3 ►
 Such negative body
image perceptions do not result just from a woman's natural, innate
tendencies, but rather spring from a variety of sources. 32 Historically,
social convention, capitalism, and male desire have all operated con-
junctively to impact how women feel about and act towards their bod-
ies." Together, these influences create an image of the beautiful body
that is, for many women, a physical impossibility. 34
The ideal female form is a thinly structured, large-breasted
body." Scholars like Naomi Wolf argue that society alienates women
from their bodies and their sexuality. 36 Furthermore, psychologists
contend that a woman has a strong need to pursue and preserve her
beauty because a woman's body image is at the core of who she is. 37 As
current social commentary reflects, many American women conse-
quently respond to these social pressures by engaging in a form of war
with their bodies." As a result, they often develop unhealthy eating
disorders, and possess low self-esteem. 39 Such physical and mental
deficiencies overly influence the excessive amounts of time and
" See Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588; ef. GIMLIN, supra note 17, at 9 (noting that
"group forces," such as commercial interest and professional preferences, influence
women's body image); infra notes 217-310 and accompanying text.
50
 SIIARLENE HESSE-BITTER, AM I THIN ENOUGH YET?: THE CULT OF THINNESS AND THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF IDENTITY 31 (1996).
31
 ALLIANCE FOR EATING DISORDERS AWARENESS, EATING DISORDERS STATISTICS, at
littp://www,eatingdisorderinfo.org/eating_disorders_statistics.htm
 (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
32 See HESSE-BIBER, supra note 30, at 30.
33 See id. at 31-32.
34 See id. at 50.
55 See id. at 28-29 (arguing that the Barbie doll provides young girls with a false con-
ception of what a beautiful female body looks like).
M See WOLF, supra note 17, at 11-12; Wendy Smith, Naomi Wolf: Confessions of a Feminist,
PUBLISHERS May., June 30, 1997, at 56 (revising WOLF, supra note 17).
37 See Gayle Greene, The Empire Strikes Back, THE NATION, Feb. 10, 1992, at 166.
38 See Smith, supra note 36, at 56-57.
32 Id.
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money they spend on attempts to achieve the ideal form of female
beauty.0
 Sociologists argue that this is time and money that could be
spent doing more economically, professionally, and socially produc-
tive activities.'" To understand how the law intersects with these socie-
tal pressures and women's resulting body image, one first needs to
understand the origins of the idea and obsession with beauty. 42
Historically, beauty is a virtue that reflects notions of goodness,
purity, and honesty. 43
 Society considers a beautiful person more desir-
able on various levels—for example, in cultural, sexual, and profes-
sional arenas—and this bias influences women more than men." Be-
cause of its physical basis in the human body, corporeal beauty often
overpowers other personal characteristics in any interaction of first
impression. 45
 Researchers claim that a physically attractive appearance
is the most powerful trait a person can possess, opening doors to in-
terpersonal relationships and even jobs that others may not have. 46
Similarly, researchers even suggest that a person's degree of physical
attractiveness may explain more accurately instances of disparate
treatment in society than other characteristics like race or sex. 47 In
short, a person's physical appearance quite possibly is his or her most
influential characteristic. 48
This striking importance of beauty in society is one reason why
self-esteem correlates to how physically attractive a woman feels. 49
Naomi Wolf argues that images of the "impossibly beautiful" barrage
young women today, more so than they did in the past.5° Because of
40 See JESSE-BIBER, supra note 30, at 38-39.
41 See id. at 26.
42 See Meg Gehrke, Is Beauty the Beast?, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 221, 227-30
(1994).
43 Id. at 230-33.
44
 See id. at 226.
45
 See David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance Discrimination in American
Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 193,201-03 (1995).
4 '3 See id. at 207-11.
47
 See id. at 218 (arguing that attention to race and sex considerations in American
criminal law is widespread, whereas physical appearance discrimination is largely ignored).
48 See id. at 194-97.
4° See GIMI.IN, supra note 17, at 8-9 (emphasizing the complexities of American women
who continually must negotiate their identities through constructions of beauty).
5° See WOLF, supra note 17, at 16-17; Greene, supra note 37, at 56-57 (highlighting in a
review of Naomi Wolf's book The Beauty Myth that the beauty myth acts as a form of social
coercion upon women who have found themselves liberated by feminism because the myth
propels the idea that a woman is her body and her body is not good enough, and makes
women anxious, insecure, and vulnerable by barraging them with images of physical per-
fection).
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these highly sexualized, physically stunning images, women often find
themselves trying to achieve higher and higher levels of physical
beauty." As a result, beauty may be oppressive to women because its
endless pursuit forces women to engage in self-destructive bodily
harm, such as excessive dieting, exercising, bingeing, or purging.52
Furthermore, women who rely so strongly on personal beauty as a
means of manipulating power from men also find themselves in de-
structive and oppressive positions. 53 In a power-driven social system
such as ours, women often use their beauty to get what, they want from
men, yet they may still find themselves being controlled by male no-
tions of the beautiful female body. 54
In sum, being and becoming beautiful is a common preoccupa-
tion of many women today, who often take extreme measures to attain
such a preferred status." As Part II discusses, when these women en-
ter the workforce, they not only take these preoccupations with them,
but also find their employers to be preoccupied with the same notions
of physical appearance and beauty." Policies and procedures that
reflect such beauty stereotypes implicitly create appearance discrimi-
nation in the workplace.57
II. PERSONAL APPEARANCE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
Many employers reinforce stereotypical norms of beauty in their
hiring practices, using a person's level of attractiveness as an impor-
tant employment criterion." One survey of employers even found
physical appearance to be the single most important factor in the hir-
ing-decision process." Unsurprising to even a casual observer, em-
ployers are likely to want their employees to conform to the culture of
the organization, which often requires meeting certain standards of
dress or appearance." Some economists argue that an attractive
51 See IlEssE-limm, supra note 30, at 11.
52 See id. at 14.
55 See Gehrkc, supra note 42, at 243.
54 Id. at 246-47.
55 See id. at 237-38.
56 See, e.g., Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 586 (Ct. App. 2003); in-
fra notes 58-216 and accompanying text...
57 See Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; infra notes 220-310 and accompanying text.
55 See Yanowitz, 13l Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; Vo, supra note 7, at 342.
" Vo, supra note 7, at 342.
" See id. at 342-43; Davis Bushnell, Personal Image as Business Strategy, BOSTON Gump:,
Mar. 21, 2004, at CI (showing that appearance is emerging as an import 'pt issue in the
workplace, that employees with a sharp appearance can stand out with • ers and hir-
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workforce equals a more productive workforce, and therefore taking
appearance into consideration is a wholly justifiable hiring practice
Similarly, if a customer values an employee's appearance, then an
employer argues that it serves as a legitimate ground for job
qualification.62
 Such employers assert that an attractive, female
workforce positively impacts profitability. 65 Given this socioeconomic
importance of physical beauty, the following discussion addresses the
legal contexts through which courts have addressed workplace ap-
pearance. 64
Part ILA explores appearance discrimination under the liberty
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution.65 In such cases, plaintiffs claim that personal liberty is infringed
upon by appearance-related regulations. 66 Next, Part II.B discusses ap-
pearance discrimination under Title VIPs protection against sex dis-
crimination. 67 The related case law focuses on instances when private
employers seek to impose both grooming regulations and standards of
attractiveness on employees. 59 Part ILC examines legal protection for
appearance discrimination under federal disability laws, most notably
the ADA.° The discussion focuses on instances of obesity discrimina-
tion as related to female appearance issues." Lastly, Part ILD briefly
discusses certain state and local statutes that address appearance dis-
crimination more specifically than other areas of the law. 7 '
ing managers in today's tight job market, and that employees themselves realize the need
for a positive appearance and for employing tactics such as image consulting and cosmetic
surgery to put forth positive physical appearances).
61 Roberti. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?, Bus. WK., Mar. 16,
1998, at 18.
62 See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Stipp. 292,303 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Defen-
dant airline argued that physical appearance was an essential characteristic in hiring flight
attendants because its marketing campaign had been based on female sex appeal. Id.
65 See id. at 303414.
64 See infra notes 72-216 and accompanying text.
65 See U.S. CONS'''. amend. XIV, § 1; infra notes 72-103 and accompanying text.
w See infra notes 72-103 and accompanying text.
67 See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); infra notes 104-166
and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 104-166 and accompanying text.
69 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; infra notes 167-202
and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 167-202 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes '203-216 and accompanying text.
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A. Legal Protection Under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Employers often attempt to regulate what employees wear and
how they may appear in the workplace." Such policies often include
the regulation of hair length, dress code requirements, and manda-
tory makeup application." When employees challenge such practices,
a popular, but frequently unsuccessful, avenue for challenging such
policies is under the constitutional guarantee of liberty contained in
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 74
The U.S. Supreme Court has offered minimal protection against
governmental interference in personal appearance choices under the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." This substantive Due Process
Clause provides that in some cases, excessive governmental regulation
of appearance may be an impermissible intrusion upon liberty. 77 Nev-
ertheless, the liberty interest receives little favorable consideration
from courts because such an interest must be balanced against the
public employer's interest." In most instances, the public employer's
interest prevails, which allows managerial decisions to control the ac-
ceptability of physical appearances."
For instance, in 1976, in Kelley u Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld hair grooming standards for police officers against the plain-
tiff's claim that the regulation unconstitutionally intruded upon his
liberty by unduly restricting his activities. 80 The officer in Kelley chal-
72 See, e.g., Carroll v. Tatman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029 (7th Cie
1979) (holding that an employer's dress policy requiring women to wear uniforms and
men to wear business casual clothes qualifies as sex discrimination).
79 See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1976) (pertaining to hair length
and hair style regulations for police officers); Tarnimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d
1550, 1554 (111th Cir. 1987) (pertaining to make-up requirements for women); Carroll, 604
F.2d at 1029 (requiring women to wear work unifiirms).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "lobo state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
75 Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 New ENG. L. Rev.
1395, 1402 (1992).
76 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
77 See, e.g., Kelley, 425 U.S. at 249 (Powell, J., concurring).
78 See id. at 246-47; Klare, supra note 75, at 1402.
79 Klare, supra note 75, at 1402.
8(' 425 U.S. at 248 (noting that police department regulations prob.iii!ed beards and
goatees and required hair to conform to a certain length).
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lenged the police department's regulation of facial hair.° The Court
held that forced similarity in police officer appearance was rationally
related to public safety because the grooming standards would make
the officers uniformly recognizable to the public and would increase
the force's esprit de corps. 82 The Court determined that both of these
ends were ample justification for the regulation. 83
The Court opined that the defendant county should be afforded
deference in organizing its police force.84 More specifically, in carrying
out its law enforcement and public safety duties, the defendant county
could adopt employment policies it deemed most efficient. 85 The hair-
length regulation was not considered in isolation, but rather in the
context of how the defendant county chose to organize itself structur-
ally." Given that the primary responsibility of police officers is the
safety of people and property and that all police forces set rules regard-
ing organized dress, the Court did not find a regulation to groom one-
self in a particular manner to be an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.87
Also in 1976, in Tardiff v. Quinn, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed a liberty claim relating to the socio-legal expectation
of female physical appearance, upholding a governmental actor's
regulation of female clothing." In Tardiff, a public high school official
fired a teacher because he disapproved of her short skirt." The plain-
tiff teacher argued that the termination for wearing a short skirt vio-
lated her liberty interest." The trial court found that the teacher's
outfit was within reasonable limits, was not lewd, and was similar to
outfits worn by other professional women. 91 The court further found
that her clothing did not have an adverse or startling effect on her
students or her ability to teach effectively."
Despite its findings, the trial court failed to reach the question of
whether the teacher's termination violated her Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to liberty." The First Circuit Court of Appeals sustained
Id. al 239-40.
92 See id. at 248.
83 Id.
Hi Id. at 246.
85 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 246.
89 Id. at 247.
87 Irl. at 248.
88 545 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1 976).
89 Id. at 762.




98 Tardiff, 545 F.2d at 763.
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the plaintiffs termination, finding that the government's interest in
approving a public school teacher's image and in assuring productiv-
ity through proper dress sufficiently outweighed the plaintiffs interest
in being free to choose her clothing." Furthermore, the First Circuit
determined that the plaintiffs clothes could have negatively impacted
her ability to teach." Here, the government's managerial discretion
and public policies prevailed over the plaintiffs personal liberty to
define her style and appearance. 96 The First Circuit did not consider
the invasion of the plaintiffs freedom of choice in personal appear-
ance to be so irrational or motivated by bad faith as to constitute a
violation of Fourteenth Amendment liberty guarantees. 97
Both Kelley and Tardiff  present unsuccessful attempts to apply
substantive due process liberty protections to appearance-based litiga-
tion," Decided in the mid-1970s, these two cases rejected the plain-
tiffs' claims that government-propounded appearance regulations
compromised their liberty interests." In effect, this liberty theory of-
fered little protection to government workers harmed by alleged ap-
pearance discrimination.'" The liberty argument, however, can be
used only in cases involving an , employer that is a state actor. 101 As a
result, plaintiffs seeking to address appearance discrimination against
private employers had to develop a more applicable and effective le-
gal argument. 02 The next Section discusses this evolution by examin-
ing the application of Title V11 sex-discrimination protection to cases
involving appearance issues.'"
94 Id. at 764.
95




98 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; Tardiff, 545 F.2d at 764.
99 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; Tardiff, 545 F.2(1 at 764.
100 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; Tardiff 545 F.2d at 764.
1 ° 1 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; Tardiff, 545 F.2d at 764.
191 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 248; Tardiff, 545 F.2d at 764.
103 See Kelley,cry 425 U.S. at 248; Tardiff, 545 F.2d . at 764; supra notes 104-166 and accom-
panying text.
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B. Legal Protection Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
Sex Discrimination
When a party raises a claim of appearance discrimination, the
individual may be afforded protection under Title VII.'" This statute
makes it unlawful to discriminate based on sex or gender in employ-
ment.m Generally, when an appearance issue is litigated under Title
VII, it arises for one of two reasons: (I) a plaintiff is challenging an
employer's rule that unfairly regulates appearance, such as mandatory
uniforms or makeup application for women, or (2) an employer has
required an attractive or beautiful appearance as a condition of em-
ployment."
1. Employer Grooming Regulations
In cases where employers regulate employee grooming, courts
may afford substantial deference to managerial discretion in framing
workplace dress codes)" Nevertheless, because one goal of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was to address gender discrimination and even to
help break down some of the negative stereotypes affecting women,
employers cannot impose unequal grooming standards for men and
women." Such behavior constitutes sex discrimination. 10
For example, in 1979, in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer's
policy requiring women to wear a uniform, but allowing men to wear
customary business attire, constituted sex discrimination.n 0
 The court
reasoned that this dress policy resulted in disparate treatment because
no business necessity existed for subjecting employees who all per-
form the same functions to different dress codes based on sex."' Fur-
ther, the court determined that such a policy reinforced notions of
women having a less professional status than men because society
1 " See, e.g, Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971)
(finding a Title VII sex discrimination violation because being female is not a bona fide
occupational qualification fur the job of flight attendant).
105 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
146 Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1029; Yanowith, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
107 See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text; see also Klare, supra note 75, at
1432-33 (arguing that such discretion generally reinforces sexist social norms of how
women should dress and look).
it'" See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032-33; Klare, supra note 75, at 1416.
1 °9 See, e.g., Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032-33.
no Id.
01 Id. at 1032.
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generally views uniformed workers as less professional." 2 Implicitly, it
reasoned that both men and women should be able to make appear-
ance decisions for themselves in this particular work environment. 1 I 5
The court refused to endorse a code that exhibited the gender stereo-
type that women cannot exercise sound judgment in choosing busi-
ness attire and need a uniform to aid them." 4
Title VII also may be used to address the gender stereotype that
women are sexual beings who can be exploited for the pleasure of
men. 115 For instance, requiring women to wear sexually provocative
clothing easily may subject them to verbal or sexual harassment, yet it
remains a common practice in many bars and restaurants. 16 Requir-
ing women to look or dress a certain way may or may not be an ac-
ceptable employment policy, depending on how justified the policy is
for the advancement of business.' 17
For instance, in 1981, in EEOC v. Sage Really Corp., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
a policy requiring women to wear a revealing uniform was unlawful
because of its sexually exploitive nature." 9 In that case, the plaintiff
was a lobby attendant who had to wear a uniform that she found too
short and too revealing of her thighs and buttocks. 119 The court found
that, but for her gender, the plaintiff would not be required to wear a
uniform that subjected her to sexual harassment. 129 Because the de-
fendant did not offer any legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations
for the uniform, the court would not accept the uniform policy as
reasonable.' 2 ' Recognizing the correlation between skimpy uniforms
and sexual harassment, the court refused to allow employers to en-
courage such abuse.' 22
Both Carroll and Sage apply Title VII sex discrimination protec-
tion to cases involving appearance regulations.' 23 Decided in the late
1970s and early 1980s, these cases limited an employer's ability to
112 Id. at 1033.
113
 See id.
114 See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032-33.
L 10 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); infra notes 118-126
and accompanying text,
114 See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Stipp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
ILl See id. at 611.
11a I,l
119 Id. at 604.
120 Id. at 607.
121 Sage, 507 F. Supp. at 608-09.
122 See id. at 611.
120 See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033; Sage, 507 F. Snip. at 611.
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mandate certain codes of dress, most notably for women. 124 They pre-
ceded opinions in the mid-1980s, which addressed an employer's abil-
ity to mandate specific levels of attractiveness—again, most notably for
women. 125
 The following discussion examines this precise context. 126
2. Employer Standards of Attractiveness
Discrimination claims based on an employer's desire for an "at-
tractive" or "sexy" employee also may be litigated under Title V11. 127
This preference creates an implicit "attractiveness" requirement for
many jobs.' 28 Employers generally prefer beautiful women to unattrac-
tive women, a common preference that can be applied to society at
large. 129 Scholars agree that attractive people have an automatic advan-
tage in the workplace in finding employment and advancing their ca-
reers,'" Furthermore, a court is likely to validate the claim that em-
ployers may engage in appearance discrimination when an employee's
appearance serves as a bona fide occupational qualification that is rea-
sonably necessary for the normal operations of a business. 131
The litigation involving the airline industry's attempts to impose
strict beauty requirements on female flight attendants exemplifies the
limits of claiming such an occupational qualification. 132 For example,
in 1981, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas held that female sex appeal
was not a necessary qualification for performing the primary business
duties of an airline attendant.'" The defendant airline employed a
marketing strategy of femininity, love, and sex appeal to attract male
clientele.'" To promote its image of "spreading love all over Texas,"
124 See Carroll, 604 F.2d at'1033; Sage, 507 F. Stipp. at 611.
125 See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033; Sage, 507 F. Stipp. at 611; we infra notes 127-166 and
accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 127-166 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 296-97.
128
 See id. at 296.
129 Klare, supra note 75, at 1421; see also Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap
Law to Discrimination an the Basis of Physical Appearance. 100 1-1Atev. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (1987)
(noting that people in American society have a visceral dislike for all things and people
unattractive and that unattractive people generally are treated worse than those consid-
ered attractive).
139 See Klare, supra note 75, at 1421.
131 See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1213, 1215-17 (8th Cir. 1985); infra
notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
132
 See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 303.
'"
134 Id. at 294.
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the defendant dressed its female employees in high boots and reveal-
ing hot pants) 35 The airline claimed that female sex appeal was a bona
fide occupational qualification that was necessary to fulfill its promise
of bringing passengers airborne with love)" The airline argued that it
could hire only sexy, attractive, female flight attendants because only
they would personify the sexy image of its marketing campaign) 37
The Wilson court disagreed)" It rejected this claim, contending
that sex appeal had no bearing on how a woman or a man performed
the primary duties of being a flight attendant)" The court did not find
this requirement to be one of business necessity, but rather one of
business convenience. 140 It characterized the contention that business
success relied on the sexy female image as "speculative at best." 141 It
further found that the defendant adopted the female image "at its own
discretion, to promote a business unrelated to sex." 142 The court implic-
itly rejected the idea that female sexuality can be exploited as a market-
ing tool simply because of male preferences for attractive women. 143
Despite this holding, employers still may be able to impose "attrac-
tiveness" requirements if the same standards are applied equally to men
and women)" For example, the Wilson court explained that being a
woman could he a bona fide occupational qualification for the position
of a Playboy bunny because female sexuality and attractiveness fur-
thered the purpose of the business—to entice male customers. 145 In
certain instances, therefore, female sex appeal and a beautiful appear-
ance are sustainable, acceptable employment qualifications. 146
Under this theory, in 1985, in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a sex discrimination case against a
news station that demoted a female anchor because of negative reac-
135 Id. at 294-95.
156 Id. at 293.
137 Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 293.
100 Id. at 302.
I" Id.
(rioting that discrimination based on sex is
onvenience).
140 Id, at 303; see also Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388
valid only for business necessity, not horsiness
141 Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 303.
142 1d.
140 See hi
144 See Craft, 7(16 F.2d at 1209-10 (8th Cir. I
Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
MICH. L. Rev. 2541,2544 (1994) (noting that
by reference to social and community norms
stereotypes).
145 Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 301.
145 See id.
985); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls
Community Norms and Workplace Equality, 92
courts rationalize appearance requirements
that simply reinforce and legitimize gender
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dons to the anchor's physical appearance) 47 The court rejected the
female anchor's argument that the station's appearance standards
were based on stereotypical characterizations of the sexes, and that
standards of attractiveness were applied more strictly to women than
to men)" It held that the employer could rely on sex stereotypes of
beautiful women given the conservative market in Kansas City and the
technical matters of lighting and color coordination) 49 The court
then concluded that the appearance requirements were not unduly
burdensome to women and that the requirements were not guided by
stereotypical notions of female roles and appearances)." Such stan-
dards were the product of professional and technical considerations,
making them reasonable business qualifications) 51 Consequently, the
court decided that the employer had a "legitimate need" to address
the plaintiff's growing indifference to the type of image that the sta-
tion wanted her to display) 52 Relying on a dependable market survey,
the court found that the station made a reasonable decision in remov-
ing the plaintiff from her news anchor position)"
Recently, in 2003, in Yanawitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc,, the California
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of appearance discrimination in
the context of Title VII, holding that an order to fire a female em-
ployee for not meeting a male executive's standards of sexual desir-
ability constituted sex discrimination. 154 The plaintiff was a manager
of a cosmetics counter who refused to terminate an employee because
her boss did not find the employee physically attractive enough) 55
The manager explained to the plaintiff that he did not think the
woman was "good looking enough" for the position and told her to
"get me somebody hot."'" When the plaintiff refused this order, the
manager pointed to a young blonde and said, "God damn it, get me
one that looks like that." 167 The manager allegedly preferred fair-
skinned blondes, and the female employee was darker skinned)" The
147
 766 F.2c1 at 1215-16.
145 Id. at 1213,1216.
145 Id. at 1215.
150 Id. at 1215-16.
151 Id.
152 Craft, 766 F.2(1 at 1217,
153 Id.
154 131 Gal. Rim. 2c1 at 588.
155 Id. at 586.
' 56 Id.
157 Id. at 582.
158 Id. at 586.
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plaintiff never carried out the order and lost her job as a result. 159 The
trial court analyzed this behavior as an act of sex discrimination, ques-
tioning whether a male executive could order a woman to be termi-
nated for not hiring women who were sexually appealing to him when
the same appearance standards did not apply to male employees. 16°
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, holding
that a clear order to fire a female employee for failing to meet the male
manager's personal standards for sexual attractiveness amounted to sex
discrimination. 16 ' The appellate court contended that the evidence al-
lows for an inference that the executive would not have ordered the
firing of a male employee because a man's physical attractiveness would
not have been an issue. 162 Implicitly, this case establishes a potential
cause of action for appearance discrimination under Title VII. 163
Plaintiffs often seek to assert Title VII sex discrimination protec-
tions when employers mandate certain levels of attractiveness, just as
they do in cases involving employer grooming regulations.m Wilson
and Yanowitz exemplify an application of this protection; Craft exem-
plifies a rejection of this protection. 165 The next Section moves away
from sex discrimination protection and discusses how disability case
law addresses appearance issues. 166
C. Legal Protection Under Federal Disability Laws
Employees who find themselves victims of appearance discrimi-
nation also may be able to seek relief under the ADA. 167 If an appear-
ance trait qualifies as a disabling condition, the victim of appearance
discrimination may be afforded legal protection. 168 The definition of
a disability under the ADA is a mental or physical impairment that
creates a substantial limitation of a major life activity) 69 The statute
159 Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
110 s„,.,
161 Id. at 588.
162 hi.
163 McDonald, supra note 1, at. 127; see Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rim.. 2d at 587 11.5, 588.
164 Compare supra notes 107-126 and accompanying text (addressing employer groom-
ing regulations), with supra notes 127-163 and accompanying text (addressing Title VII sex
discrimination).
t 65 See Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215-16; Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 303; Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rpm'. 2c1
at 588.
" See infra notes 167-106 and accompanying text.
167 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (20001
14. § 12102(2); Adamitis, supra note 1, at 200.
169 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A)—(C).
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allows an individual to have a record of impairment or simply be per-
ceived as being impaired.'"
Appearance discrimination claims that rely on the ADA often
deal with obese individuals. 171 Certainly, obese people generally do
not fit the norm of American beauty.'" In comparison to those of av-
erage weight, obese individuals earn less money, are less likely to
marry, and are subject to more discrimination in the workplace.'"
Despite this discrimination, to have a cause of action under the ADA,
obese people first must show that obesity is a disability. 174
 To claim
that obesity is a disability, individuals must prove that obesity substan-
tially limits a major life activity, such as walking, talking, or working.'"
Alternatively, individuals must show that others regard them as being
limited in a significant life activity)"
Courts, however, have not applied a consistent standard to de-
termine whether obesity qualifies as a disability)" In 1993, in Cassista
v. Community Foods, Inc., the Supreme Court of California held that an
obese woman was not disabled because her excessive weight condition
did not affect a basic bodily system or inhibit a major life activity.'"
After a health food store refused employment to an obese woman be-
cause of the management's concerns about her heavy weight, the
woman sued for employment discrimination.'" Here, the court held
that weight, unrelated to a physiological, systematic disorder, does not
constitute a handicap or disability. 180 As such, for obesity to be pro-
170 lrl. § 12102(2) (B)—(C).
171 Adamitis, supra note 1, at 201; see Peter J. Perron', Cook v. Rhode Island, Depart-
ment of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals: The First Circuit Tips the Scales offu.stice to
the Overweight, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 993, 994-1004 (1996) (providing relevant background
on obesity discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA")).
172 See Jane Byeff Korn, FAT, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25, 25-26 (1997).
173 Perroni, supra note 171, at 993.
174 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Kimberly B. Dunworth, Cassista v. Community Foods,
Inc.: Drawing the Line at Obesity?, 24 GuineN GATE U. L. Rev. 523, 531 (1994) (noting that
the majority of cases considering weight-based discrimination do not consider obesity' to be
a disability).
175
 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
176 Id. § 12102(2) (C).
' 77 Compare, e.g., Cook v. R.I., Dept of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17,
26 (1st Cir. l993) (holding that an obese woman was not disabled), with, e.g., Cassista v. Cnity.
Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 1993) (holding that an obese woman was disabled).
I" 856 P.2d at 1154.
179 Id. at 1145, 1149-50 (explaining that the plaintiff brought her claim of handicap dis-
crimination tinder California's FEHA, which was modeled after the ADA and forbids em-
ployment discrimination based on disability); see CAL. Gov'T Comm § 12940(h) (West 1992).
18 ' ) Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1154.
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tected under the law, an employee must show some physiological basis
for the weight problem. 181 The court contended that the plaintiff did
not provide any evidence that she suffered from, or that the employer
regarded her as suffering from, a form of physiologically induced
obesity. 182 The fact that the plaintiff considered herself to be a
healthy, fit individual aside from her weight problem helped the court .
conclude that she did not demonstrate an actual or perceived physical
handicap. 183 Rather, the court concluded that her obesity was a "tran-
sitory or self-imposed condition" which she could alter voluntarily, as
opposed to a condition that was immutable or irreversible. 184
Conversely, in 1993, in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental
Health, Retardation & Hospitals, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an overweight person could be protected statutorily as dis-
abled. 185 Unlike any previous decision before it, this case represented
a groundbreaking step in addressing the pervasive problem of weight-
based appearance discrimination. 186 In this case, the plaintiff applied
for employment at a mental health facility. 187 Her routine pre-hire
physical indicated that she was morbidly obese. 188 The defendant
health facility claimed that this condition jeopardized her ability to
evacuate patients in the event of an emergency and left her suscepti-
ble to various health risks. 189 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
refused to hire her because of her perceived disability, and she sued
for disability discrimination. 19°
Relying on a perceived disability theory, the court held that obe-
sity may be categorized as a disability entitled to protection under
federal law.lim The court rejected the argument that obesity should
not receive disability protection because it is a voluntary, mutable
181 Id. at 1155.
182 hi. at 1154.
183 Id,
184 See id. at 1152.
185 10 F.3d at 26.
IN See Cook, 10 F.3d at 24; Perrot* supra note 171, at 1018.
187 Cook, 10 F.3d at 20.
188 Id. at 20-21.
189 Id. at 21.
190 Id.; see Perron', supra note 171, at 994-96. Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to prohibit discrimination by recipients of federal funding against otherwise qualified
people with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2000); Perroni, supra note 171, at 994-96.
The Rehabilitation Act is the precursor to the ADA, which defined disability similarly and
extended disability protection to the private sector. Perroni, supra note 171, at 994-96; see 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-797; Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
191 Cook, 10 F.3d at 24.
378
	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:359
characteristic, noting that numerous conditions, which often may be
caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct, receive disability protec-
tion. 192
 Furthermore, the court held that sufficient evidence existed to
prove that obesity was caused by a permanent condition—a dysfunc-
tional metabolism.'" Finding the plaintiff to be otherwise qualified
for the position, the court decided that an employer cannot refuse to
hire someone merely because the individual possesses an obesity
handicap.' 94 Perceived inability to function in a certain context due to
the possession of either a perceived or real handicap was not a
sufficient ground for an unfavorable employment hiring decision.'"
The employer's decision must be objectively reasonable, and given
that the plaintiff's duties would be similar to those she had performed
positively in the past, the appellate court determined that the lower
court's finding was unreasonable, and the action was unlawfully dis-
criminatory. 196
Both Cook and Cassino address appearance issues through the
invocation of disability law. 197
 These two courts assume varying ap-
proaches in the classification of obesity as a disability.' 98 They offer
examples of another legal theory that claimants can utilize in seeking
redress for appearance discrimination.'"
The legal theories that this Part has examined thus far— constitu-
tional liberty, sex discrimination, and disability discrimination—do
not focus explicitly on appearance discrimination. 200
 Rather, they ad-
dress it implicitly through broader legal protections."' Some state and
local governments, however, address the issue through specific ap-
pearance discrimination statutes. 2°2
192 Id. (listing heart disease, alcoholism, and cancer from cigarette smoking as exam-
ples of conditions that receive disability protection despite their potential to be caused or





 See Cook, 10 F.3(1 at 27.
197 See Cook, l0 F.3d at 24; Cassista, 856 P.2c1 at 1154; supra notes 167-196 and accom-
panying text.
196 See Cook, 10 F.3(1 at 24; Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1154; supra notes 167-196 and accom-
panying text.
199 See Cook, 10 F.3(1 at 24; Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1154; supra notes 167-196 and accom-
panying text.
200 See supra notes 72-196 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 72-196 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 203-212 and accompanying text.
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D. State and Local Statutes Prohibiting Appearance-Based Discrimination
A limited number of jurisdictions have laws banning appearance-
base(' discrimination. 208 For example, the District of Columbia en-
acted a statute prohibiting employment discrimination and included
personal appearance as a protected categor y.2°4 This statute defines
personal appearance as the "outward appearance of any person, irre-
spective of sex, with regard to bodily condition or characteristics,
manner or style of dress, and manner or style of personal grooming,
including, but not limited to hair style and beards.”208 In 1986, in At-
lantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a finding of per-
sonal appearance discrimination in violation of this appearance dis-
crimination law.200 In this case, an employer criticized a female em-
ployee for her provocative clothing. 207 Because the employee's
appearance was similar to her colleagues and the company had not
enacted a dress code or any other physical appearance standards, the
court held that sufficient evidence in the record existed to justify a
finding of appearance discrimination. 208
Other jurisdictions that seek to curb appearance discrimination
include the state of Michigan and the city of Santa Cruz, California. 20°
Michigan bans appearance discrimination based on height and
weight.210 Santa Cruz, California likewise bans discrimination based
on physical characteristics that result from events beyond a person's
control, including physical mannerisms. 211 As a result, state and local
appearance statutes like those mentioned above provide yet another
avenue for addressing instances of appearance discrimination. 212
In sum, when faced with an instance of appearance discrimina-
tion, a victim may have a cause of action under the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VII, the ADA, or state and local
statutes that provide additional protection against appearance dis-
2111 AdiiI»HiS, supra note I, at 209.
201 D.C.. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11(a) (2001).
205 Id. § 2-1401.02(22).
a* 515 A.2d 1095, 1100-01 (D.C. 1986).
207 Id.
209 Id.
209 See SANTA CRUZ, CAL., PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ch. 9.83 (1995);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (2004).
21° MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202.
211 SANTA CRUZ, CAL., PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION Cll. 4"/ WI.
212 See supra notes 203-211 and accompanying (ext.
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crimination. 2 " Liberty arguments do not fare well against the gov-
ernment's legitimate need to regulate appearances. 214 Sex discrimina-
tion and disability discrimination claims may offer some protection
for victims of appearance discrimination, though this protection often
is implicit or periphera1. 2" State and local statutes offer the most ex-
plicit form of protection against appearance discrimination. 2"
DI. ANALYSIS: THE FAVORABLE IMPACT OF APPEARANCE
DISCRIMINATION LAW ON THE FEMALE BODY
The law is moving in a positive direction for women as it begins
to proffer the idea that women need not meet certain standards of
beauty. 217 Implicitly, this signals to women that their bodies need not
conform to one ideal form in order to be beautiful, and also that a
positive body image need not be constrained by man's demand for
the perfect female body. 218 Such a trend is good for women because it
helps deconstruct the social and economic value placed on their bod-
ies, while deemphasizing the importance of physical perfection.219
A. How the Law Reflects Conceptions of Female Beauty
The legal discourse on appearance issues implicitly reflects social
constructions of female beauty. 22° Society compels many women to
become obsessed with their personal appearance and the physical at-
tainment of beatity. 221 Women's obsession with beauty perpetuates
their subordinate status in society. 222 It exposes them to male habits of
exploitation as well as to the dangers inherent in the beauty Indus-
try.223 The messages women receive at young ages from these sources
include the idea that a woman's role in life is to be beautiful, and that
215 See supra notes 72-211 and accompanying text.
214
	 supra notes 72-103 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 104-199 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 203 -21 1 and accompanying text.
217 See infra notes 220-310 and accompanying text.
215 See infra notes 220-310 and accompanying text; if Wm."-, supra note 17, at 10 (noting
that although women today have more legal and economic power than ever before, they
actually feel worse physically about themselves than their "unliberated grandmothers").
213 See infra notes 220-310 and accompanying text.
223 See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205,1216 (8th Cir. 1985); Yanowitz v.
L'Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575,586 (Ct. App. 2003); McDonald, supra note 1, at 118.
221 See FIESSE-BIBER, supra note 30, at 28-29 (noting the pervasive impact of the media
on women's body image).
222 Gehrke, supra note 42, at 238.
223 Id. at 237-38.
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women should become beautiful at any painstaking cost. 224 Despite
the liberating efforts of the modern women's movement, society at
large still determines a woman's self worth by her ability to attract a
man.225 Likewise, the law contributes to and often reflects this impulse
in its treatment of appearance discrimination cases. 228
In cases where an employer may need to take personal appear-
ance into consideration as a business necessity, the employer may as-
sert a bona fide occupational qualification. 227 Yet such a rule can
place women in precarious situations because justifying a type of dis-
crimination based on social affinity for the beautiful may impact ad-
versely those who cannot meet such strict aesthetic standards. 228 Con-
sequently, such discrimination can have negative effects on a woman's
perception of self worth, making her increasingly preoccupied with
her body, her weight, and her degree of physical attractiveness. 229
Given this culture of bodily obsession in which images of thin, beauti-
ful women permeate everyday life, the law often reflects the ingrained
and unchallenged idea that women must conform to traditional no-
tions of beauty and physical appearance." 9 Such traditional norms are
thoroughly sexist and patriarchal."'
Although in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the groom-
ing requirements of a male police officer in Kelley v. Johnson, the deci-
sion illustrates how the law favors socially ingrained standards of ap-
pearance, intimating that a pattern needs to be followed to sustain
social order."2 This case exemplifies the law's readiness to subvert per-
sonal autonomy and appearance diversity. 233 Such a tendency certainly
has a more significant impact on women than men given the social im-
portance of female appearance. 234 A consequential effect for women is
that the law reinforces idealized notions of beauty—forms of appear-
ance that do not and cannot represent reality for many women. 2g 5
224 See id.
223 ESSE- BI BER, supra note 30, at 13.
226 See, e.g., Grafi, 766 F.2d at 1217 (holding that a news station was justified in termi-
nating a news anchor for not meeting attractiveness standards).
227 See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 Flal 385,386 (5th Cir. 1971).
228 See Adatnitis, supra note 1, at 213-14.
22° See Glazer, supra note 17, at 115-16.
25° See, e.g., Craft, 766 F.2(.1 at 1217.
251 See Klare, supra note 75, at 1420.
252 See 425 U.S. 238,248 (1976).
255 See id.
254 See 1-JESSE-BIDER, supra note 30, at 29.
235 See Craft, 766 F.2(1 at 1217.
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In 1976, in Tardiff v. Quinn, the First Circuit Court of Appeals of-
fered an example of how physical appearance stereotypes imbue the
law. 238
 In this case, the First Circuit found a school's concern with the
short length of a teacher's skirt to be reasonable. 237 The government's
managerial discretion prevailed over the plaintiff's sense of personal
liberty to define her style and appearance. 238 In effect, the court
stifled the teacher's creativity and definition of personal beauty by
finding in favor of the school. 23
 It insisted on reinforcing socially
normative behavior.")
Furthermore, the government employer, a public school depart-
ment official, never explained the effects of skirt length on professional
productivity. 241
 The court implicitly showed great deference to stereo-
typical social norms of what is an acceptable form of dress for a school
teacher. 242 When the law reinforces socially normative behavior or ap-
pearances, whether conservative dress standards for a school teacher or
large breasts for Playboy bunnies, it reminds women that they need to
meet certain preordained standards of appearance in order to be ac-
cepted and successful in society. 243 Placing so much emphasis on female
appearance only makes women increasingly obsessed with their bodies
and their beauty, lessening the importance of other personal character-
istics like intellect or economic potentia1. 244
In contrast to Tardiff, in 1979, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in Carroll v. Tatman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, recognized how
simple regulations like dress codes can subtly perpetuate sexism. 245 In
holding that an employer cannot mandate uniforms for women with-
out requiring the same for men, this court combated a culture of sex-
ism that reflects the idea that women are not capable of choosing ap-
propriate clothes to wear to work. 248 This case provided a strong
message to women—one that said that their appearances need not be
prescribed through rules, but rather should be defined through per-
236 See 545 F.2d 761, 761-63 (1st Cir. 1976).
237 See id.
27"
239 See id. at 763.
240 See id. at 764. At the time of this case in 1976, socially normative behavior for female
school teachers was to wear longer length skirts. See





244 See INot.v, supra note 17, at 10.
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sonal choice and autonomous decision making, an important objective
for the attainment of an equal society. 247
Despite this strong message, Title VII permits the equal applica-
tion of grooming or appearance standards to both sexes because Title
VII only requires that male and female employees be treated in an
equal rnanner. 248 Because social norms decide what are acceptable be-
havior and appearances, the law reinforces the dominant form of fe-
male beauty. 249 When a social custom or practice is widely accepted,
such as the objectification of the female body, these patriarchal, hetero-
sexist sensibilities are not challenged. 25° Therefore, the encouragement
and perpetuation of gender inequality results because employers are
allowed to require employees to engage in socially accepted behavior,
so long as they require all employees to do so. 251
Employers encourage the perpetuation of bodily perfection and
obsession when they set strict grooming or physical attractiveness
standards. 252 Employer regulations of personal appearance often rein-
force sexist notions of how women should look and dress because
they demand a certain type of physical appearance. 253 Additionally,
when employers set standards of attractiveness for female employees,
they can perpetuate a normative culture that values a particularized
form of female physical beauty and sex appeal over female intellectual
and practical skills. 254 Given the heightened sensitivity to female ex-
ploitation in the workforce and growing concerns about sexual har-
assment today, the law may offer more protection to women who face
sexually exploitative treatment in the workforce as opposed to the
more subtle form of exploitation through grooming regulations. 255
In 1982, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas bravely challenged the
socially accepted desire to sexualize women. 256 The court was not will-
ing to uphold an employer's female-only hiring policy that demanded
247 See id.
218 Id. at 1031.
249 See Klare, supra note 75, at 1417-18.
2511 See id.
251 See Craft, 706 F.2d at 1209-10; Klare, supra note 75, at 1417-18 (noting that. conven-
tional social norms arc often sexist and patriarchal).
252 See, e.g., Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582.
255
 See id.
254 See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Stipp. 292,302 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
255 Compare Kelley, 425 U.S. at 239-40 (exemplifying the use of grooming regulations to
enforce socially normative behavior), with Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 303 (ev.* .irlifying the
legal and social impropriety of the sexual exploitation of women in the win: , • ;.
25G See Wilson, 517 F. Stipp. at 303.
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that its airline attendants display a certain degree of sexiness or attrac-
tiveness. 257 The effect that this decision has on feminist sensibilities
related to women's body images is noteworthy. 258 In holding that fe-
male sex appeal was not necessary for ordinary business operations,
the court focused on job performance and business purpose and not
on the female body and sex appeal. 259 In striking down its female-only
hiring policy, the court did a great service for both men and
women. 26° In opening up employment opportunities to men, this
court also implicitly told women that they did not have to exploit
their bodies in order to perform the functions of airline attendants. 26 '
In effect, this court combated the popular marketing strategy of using
female sex appeal for the attainment of market success. 262 It recog-
nized that the temptation of employers to use sex as a marketing tac-
tic is real and widespread. 265 It also recognized that women specifically
would benefit from a legal ban on such exploitative behavior. 264
Although a sexualized market culture may be pleasing to many
men (and women, too), the Wilson decision lends support to the idea
that it is not intrinsically good for women, either physically or psycho-
logically.265 Branding sex appeal or an attractive physical appearance
as an employment qualification or business necessity tells women that
they have to look a certain way to he professionally successful. 266 It
makes them use their bodies for economic gain, diminishing the im-
portance of intelligence and skill leve1. 267 Given the harmful effects
such exploitation has on women and their body images, this court did
a service for women by disallowing physical sex appeal to be a bona
fide employment qualification for flight attendants. 268
Despite the holding in Wilson, the court still recognized certain
instances where appearance standards can be justified as a business
necessity. 269 Such exceptions may continue to have harmful effects on
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female body—just so long as a business necessity justifies such cxploi-
tation. 270 Furthermore, because women are often held to stricter
standards of beauty and physical attractiveness than men, the law im-
plicitly resists opportunities to help reverse the effects of a society ob-
sessed with "beautiful" women.271 In this way, the law accepts and rein-
forces the social norm that physical beauty is natural, Favored, and
even beyond the law's control. 272
In 1985, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals in Graft v. Metromedia,
Inc. offered a good example of this assertion. 273 The court took a pre-
dictable approach to the problem of the high demand on female ap-
pearance and levels of attractiveness by reinforcing normative concep-
tions of beauty. 274 This case, in which the court upheld the employer's
decision to terminate a female news anchor because of her unfavorable
physical appearance, demonstrates how the law reinforces what women
should look like. 275 Implicitly, the case exemplifies how personal ap-
pearance discrimination encompasses judgments about women's bod-
ies and personas.27° It evidences how ingrained, traditional notions of
beauty affect employment opportunities by permitting criteria that of-
ten are unrelated to fundamental job performance, yet are viewed as a
natural part of women's being and employability. 277 Because employers
are given the opportunity to frame attractiveness as a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, they possess a certain degree of leeway in requiring
attractiveness or sex appeal in female employees.278 Demanding such
physical capabilities can be damaging to women's self-esteem because it
does not help them foster a diverse conception of what constitutes a
beautiful body.27°
The Craft court could have taken a bold step and rejected the so-
cial affinity for beautiful women, but it refused to do so. 280 Rather, it
strengthened a social norm that says that beauty is a female trait that
270 See id. at 301.
271 See Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215-16; Adatnitis, supra note 1, at 200.
272 See Graft, 766 F.2d at 1215-16; Adatnitis, supra note 1, at 200.
275 See766 F.2d at 1215-16.
274 See id.
275 See id.
276 See id.; Klare, supra note 75, at 1415.
277
	 Graft, 766 F.2d at 1216.
276 See Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting• Public and Popular Discourse About Sex Discrimina-
tion, 31 U. Mien. J.L. REFORM 551,569 (1998) (noting the significant degree of uncer-
tainty as to what extent sex appeal can be used as a bona fide occupat lona! qualification).
279 See fl ESSE-131 HER, supra note 30, at 58.
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is natural, expected, and valued. 281 It reinforced socially accepted
ideas of what a female news anchor should look like, including how
she should dress and how young she should be. 282 The court saw noth-
ing wrong with the status quo beautification of women, and likewise
did nothing to help rectify the dangers associated with a culture ob-
sessed with beautifulig 083
B. Redefining Female Beauty and Body Image Through the Law
The preceding discussion emphasizes how the law reflects social
stereotypes of female beauty for women and why this is bad for
women. 284 In measuring themselves against such standards, many
women often are left feeling not good enough, not beautiful enough,
and not worthy enough for certain jobs or relationships. 285 Yet as states
and localities recognize the harmful effects of appearance discrimina-
tion, legislation protecting the aesthetically challenged offers a possible
remedy.286
 These local statutes evidence that at least some jurisdictions
see value in remedying the harmful effects of appearance discrimina-
tion . 287
In addition, as appearance issues become more widely publicized
in the media and academia, more victims of appearance discrimina-
tion may file lawsuits against employers who use hiring practices that
favor the beautiful. 288 A statement made by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission suggests that many more lawsuits addressing
appearance issues lie ahead because of the emerging idea that the
chance to make a living should not be restricted to models and movie
stars, but rather should be given to all people with the requisite talent
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discrimination is beneficial for women because it will help break
clown and challenge the historic value placed on the physical attrac-
tiveness of their bodies. 298 By accepting more diverse forms of appear-
ance and extending civil rights through appearance law, women may
come to understand more readily that they do not have to conform to
one specific body type and that many forms of beauty can and do ex-
ist. 291 In effect, they may be able to focus their energies away from
bodily preoccupation and towards more socially and economically
productive endeavors. 292
Two recent cases offer support for the contention that the law is
beginning to foster more positive and diverse body images for women:
the First Circuit Court of Appeals' 1993 decision in Cook v. Rhode Is-
land, Department of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals, and the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal's 2003 decision in Yanowitz u L'Oreal USA,
lnc. 293 Given the resistance of the market and media to physical ap-
pearance diversification, these decisions are bold steps for the
courts. 294 These two courts should be applauded for the implicit mes-
sages that they send to women—your body does not have to define the
entire person you are; your body is not everything. 295 Furthermore,
employment opportunities, success, and happiness should not be re-
served for those who meet certain physical standards of beauty. 298
In Cook, the First Circuit Court of Appeals sought to rectify the
injustice suffered by an obese woman whose job application was de-
nied due to her weight.297 As many women struggle with weight issues,
this case exemplifies a cutting-edge sensitivity to a form of prejudice
that is both dangerous and wrong. 298
 This opinion helps fight the so-
cially accepted belief that obesity is always a voluntary and mutable
characteristic. 299 It challenges traditional assumptions about what a
woman must look like, and it values a woman's ability to work over her
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See WOLF, supra note 17, at 16.
" See Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation & I Iosps., 10 F.3d 17, 27-28
(1st Cir. 1993); Yanowitz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
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on Abercrombie & Fitch's employment preferences for "all-American" salespeople, espe-
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ability to be sexually attractive."0 In this way, this watershed opinion
helps women, many of whom struggle with their weight in a variety of
contexts, feel more accepted and protected under the law." 1 This
opinion raises social awareness about appearance discrimination, let-
ting women know that the law will not allow physical appearance to
determine who they are and what they can achieve."
Furthermore, in Yanowitz, where an employer wanted an em-
ployee terminated for not being good looking enough, the California
Court of Appeal refused to tolerate the employer's desire to have only
sexually attractive employees working for him. 503 Inferring that a male
employee's physical attractiveness would not have been an issue, the
court would not allow discrimination against women based on sexual
desirability.3" This opinion is also a positive step forward for address-
ing issues related to female bodily obsession and exploitation, prac-
tices that perpetuate notions of women as sex symbols and objects of
desire.505
 just because society accepts a certain type of behavior as
normal does not mean that such behavior is healthy, fair, or practi-
cal."6
 When the law recognizes the harm done to women's bodies and
psyches through the perpetuation of traditional female stereotypes, it
does a great service to them by attempting to challenge such stereo-
types. 50'r An opinion like Yanowitz is just one of the many ways that our
society can help women gain more positive self-images, allowing them
3°° See id.
3° 1 See id.
" See. Cook, 10 F.3d at 27-28.
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to accept their bodies for what they are and have more fulfilling lives
because of the development of this more positive self-image." The
law should continue to applaud and to strengthen this trend, which
discourages restrictions on weight, appearance, and physical beauty."
In this way the law can contribute to the deconstruction of stereotypes
that keep women intensely concerned, and too often debilitated by,
their physical appearance.TM°
CONCLUSION
Physical appearance discrimination reflects the preference society
has for beautiful women. Taken to an extreme, this tendency toward
beauty and physical appearance can have harmful effects on women's
body image and self-esteem. Because appearance often affects em-
ployment opportunities, the legal treatment of appearance discrimina-
tion issues has important consequences for women in particular.
The airline and news reporting industries began the debate about
appearance issues by insisting upon sexy, attractive female employees.
In the absence of specific appearance discrimination laws, victims often
framed their claims of appearance discrimination in terms of sex dis-
crimination. From the 1970s until now, courts have exhibited an in-
creasing willingness to protect women from appearance discrimination,
producing a legal trend that is good for women and their body images.
This trend helps deconstruct socially normative behavior that
emphasizes the importance of female beauty and physical appear-
ance. Social favoritism of the beautiful is not healthy or productive for
women. With cases like Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. raising awareness
about and protection for appearance discrimination in the workforce,
women may begin to realize that being sexy and beautiful is not a pre-
requisite for success. The end result should be a strong body of law
that breaks from social norms and that provides protection for those
whom society considers physically undesirable.
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